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LABOR RELATIONS IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
CAN GOVERNMENT GOVERN ITSELF?
Public employees, as a condition of their public service and in the
absence of any saving statute or constitutional provision, voluntarily
surrender such part of their rights as may be essential to the public
welfare.' Consequently, the public employee historically has been at
best a second class citizen2 and at worst a mere pawn almost totally
subject to government fiat.8
Government employees do not have the right to strike or picket
in the absence of legislative authorization.4 A strike by public servants
has been characterized as "an intolerable crime against civilization."5
In fact, even where employees of a private electric system had had a
collective bargaining agreement with their employer prior to the acquisi-
tion of the system by a municipality, a strike and picketing by the
workers to compel union recognition by their new public employer
was enjoined.0 President Calvin Coolidge pithily summed up the pre-
vailing view: "There is no right to strike against the public safety by
anybody anywhere at any time.' 7
Further, in the absence of an express provision to the contrary,
state statutes dealing with labor relations do not cover public em-
ployees. 8 Such employees, therefore, do not have the right to bargain
1. City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539, 542 (1947). At
least part of the reason for this attitude is the time-worn assertion that "employment by
the government is a privilege, not a right. . . ." Comment, The Rights of a Public
Employee in Nebraska, 46 NzB. L. Rtv. 884, 885 (1967).
2. For example, a federal employee cannot solicit funds from another federal
employee for political purposes. See United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75(1947) ; Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882). But cf. Bagley v. Washington Town-
ship Hosp. Dist., 65 Cal. 2d 499, 421 P.2d 409, 55 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1966) ; DeStefano
v. Wilson, 96 N.J. Super. 592, 233 A.2d 682 (1967) ; Minielly v. State, 242 Ore. 490,
411 P.2d 69 (1966).
3. For example, Alabama has attempted to require teachers to disclose all organi-
zations of which they are members; the case of Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479(1960), however, invalidated this disclosure requirement. See also Elfbrandt v. Russell,
384 U.S. 11 (1966).
4. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
109 Cal. App. 2d 81, 240 P.2d 16 (1952) ; Board of Educ. v. Reading, 32 Ill. App. 2d
567, 207 N.E.2d 427 (1965) ; City of Detroit v. Division 26, Amalgamated Ass'n of
Street Employees, 332 Mich. 237, 51 N.W.2d 228, 233 (1952) : "Under the common
law, - and there is no question about it . . . - there is no right to strike on behalf of
public employees .. " Cf. In re Berry, 436 P.2d 273, 65 Cal. Rptr. 273 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
5. President Woodrow Wilson made this statement about the Boston Police
Strike. Norwalk Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482,
484 (1951).
6. City of Alcoa v. IBEW, Local 760, 203 Tenn. 12, 308 S.W.2d 476 (1957).
In the private sector a collective bargaining agreement survives a change of employer.
See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964) ; Wackenhut Corp.
v. Int'l Plant Guard Workers, Local 151, 332 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1964).
7. Cited in Norwalk Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d
482, 484 (1951).
8. State v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 37 Cal. 2d 412, 232 P.2d 857 (1951),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 876 (1951) ; Moriarity v. Kennedy, 20 Misc. 2d 593, 192 N.Y.S.2d
32 (1959). Government employees are, of course, not covered by federal labor statutes.
See United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258 (1947) ; IBEW,
Local 976 v. Grand River Dam Authority, 292 P.2d 1018 (Okla. 1956) ; 29 U.S.C. §§
152(2), (3) (1964). Under certain circumstances, however, government may be in-
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collectively and their employer does not have the authority to negotiate
with their representatives.' Although it has been suggested that the
organization of public employees is not improper,10 at least prior to
1958 they usually did not possess the right to do so.1 In addition,
public employees have not been afforded the protection of the federal
Bill of Rights and state constitutional safeguards to the same extent as
their fellow citizens." Under certain circumstances, such as potential
subversion, they may still not receive equal constitutional protection. 3
In short, those who have served the public have been subject to
such conditions as the public wished to prescribe. Public employees
have been denied certain of their civil liberties and, in addition, have
been unable to protect themselves through practices which would be
acceptable in the private sector:
Particularly, I want to emphasize my conviction that militant
tactics have no place in the functions of any organization of
Government employees .... A strike of public employees manifests
nothing less than an intent on their part to prevent or obstruct
the operations of Government until their demands are satisfied.
Such action, looking toward the paralysis of Government by those
who have sworn to support it, is unthinkable and intolerable.' 4
NEEDED - A NEW APPROACH
During 1962 there were 28 strikes by public employees; there
were 42 such strikes in 1965, 150 in 1966, and probably about 300 in
1967. In 1961 the public service lost 15,300 man-days as a result of
volved in a labor dispute over which the National Labor Relations Board will havejurisdiction. See Plumbers, Local 298 v. County of Door, 359 U.S. 354, 359 (1959)(". . . Board jurisdiction to grant relief, far from interfering with county functions,
serves to safeguard the interests of such political subdivisions. . . .") ; Baltimore Bldg.
& Contr. Trades Council v. Maryland Port Authority, 238 Md. 232, 208 A.2d 564(1965). Further, at least an argument can be made that the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service may have some jurisdiction in public employment. 29 U.S.C.§ 142(1) (1964): "The term 'industry affecting commerce' means any industry or
activity in commerce .. "; 29 U.S.C. § 173(b) (1964): "The Service may proffer
its services in any labor dispute in any industry affecting commerce. ... It seems
that a public transport workers dispute with their employer might be likely to affect
interstate commerce.
9. International Operating Eng'rs, Local 321 v. Water Works Board, 276 Ala.
462, 163 So. 2d 619 (1964); Miami Water Works Local 654 v. City of Miami, 157
Fla. 445, 26 So. 2d 194 (1946); IBEW, Local 507 v. Hastings, 179 Neb. 515, 138
N.W.2d 822 (1965). See also Report of the Committee on the Law of Government
Employee Relations, ABA StC'rloN ON LABOR LAW 342 (1965).
10. E.g., City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539, 542 (1947).
11. In 1958 the United States Supreme Court determined that freedom of associa-
tion is a first amendment right protected against state interference by the fourteenth
amendment. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). Public employees presumably
possess this right. See McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968) (proba-
tionary school teachers cannot be dismissed for joining union).
12. See generally Leahy, The Public Employee and the First Amendment -
Must He Sacrifice His Civil Rights to Be a Civil Servant?, 4 CALIF. W. L. Rlv. 1
(1968).
13. See, e.g., Beilan v. Board of Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958) ; cf. Gardner v.
Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968).
14. Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt to the President of the National Federation
of Federal Employees, Aug. 16, 1937, cited in Norwalk Teachers Ass'n v. Board of
Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482, 484 (1951).
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strikes; in 1966, 455,000 man-days were lost.15 These figures indicate
that strikes by government employees are no longer exceptional. 16 The
prediction that rising public employment coupled with increasing unioni-
zation would result in more strikes has been fulfilled.' 7
Within a few years government will employ one-fifth of the
work force in the United States.' State and local governments are
creating one out of two new non-farm jobs 9 in the "most rapidly
growing field of employment."" ° During the last twenty years the
number of unionized public employees has probably doubled: 21 "The
swelling ranks of public employees apparently became an irresistible
target for the AFL-CIO."'22 The states have been slow to respond
to the new pressures. Innovation has occurred at the municipal level.3
This has resulted in haphazard "crazy-quilt patterns" of state and local
procedures which tend to threaten fundamental due process.' 4
Part of the problem in public employment can be traced to em-
ployee organization rivalry." The most thoroughly studied example
of such rivalry is that between the National Education Association
and the AFL-CIO's American Federation of Teachers.' 6 The NEA
and the AFT are divided by different basic concepts concerning the
15. Nesvig, The New Dimensions of the Strike Question, 28 PUB. ADMIN. Riv.
126-27 (1968).
16. Posey, The New Militancy of Public Employees, 28 PUB. ADMIN. RZv. 111,
113 (1968).
17. Anderson, Disputes Affecting Government Employees, 10 LAB. L.J. 707
(1959). See also Raskin, Why New York is "Strike City", The New York Times,
Dec. 22, 1968, Magazine Section at 7: "Civil servants all over the country are begin-
ning to feel their muscle, heedless of the restraints imposed by no-strike laws. . ....
18. Public employees currently account for 17% of the total employment. Com-
ment, The Strike and Its Alternatives in Public Employment, 1966 Wis. L. RZv. 549
(1966).
19. Id.
20. Nesvig, The New Dimensions of the Strike Question, 28 PUB. ADMIN. Rv.
126, 127 (1968).
21. Posey, The New Militancy of Public Employees, 28 PUB. ADMIN. Rzv. 111,
112 (1968).
22. Nesvig, The New Dimensions of the Strike Question, 28 PUB. ABMIN. RXV.
126 (1968). The gains which can be achieved by cooperative effort are even being
recognized by the bench. Twenty-seven judges of Michigan's Third Circuit joined
together to sue a county to compel it to provide them with sufficient court personnel.
The judges were successful in their suit, TIM4, Dec. 13, 1968, at 60-62.
23. McKelvey, The Role of State Agencies in Public Employee Relations, 20 IND.
& LAB. RxL. Rzv. 179, 183 (1967). "Almost all of these developments at the municipal
level have occurred without the encouragement or protection of state legislation.
Id. at 184.
24. Id. at 186. See also Report of the Committee on the Law of Government Em-
ployee Relations, ABA SgCTION ON LABOR LAW 333 (1965).
25. Employee organizations disagree also about basic concepts of government
labor-management relations. See generally Donoian, The AFGE and the AFSCME:
Labor's Hope for the Future?, 18 LAB. L.J. 727 (1967). For example, the late Mike
Quill once "attacked the whole concept of fact-finding .. " Raskin, Why New York
is "Strike City", The New York Times, Dec. 22, 1968, Magazine Section at 8.
26. See generally McKelvey, The Role of State Agencies in Public Employee
Relations, 20 IND. & LAB. RtL. Rev. 179 (1967) ; Posey, The New Militancy of Public
Employees, 28 PUB. ADMIN. Rtv. 111 (1968) ; Schmidt, Representation of Classroom
Teachers, 91 MONTHLY LAB. RiV. 27 (July, 1968); Collins, Labor Relations Under
Boards of Education and in Other Municipal Employment, 19 N.Y.U. CONF. ON LABOR
181 (1967).
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role of teacher organizations, collective bargaining, state legislation,
unit determination and impasse resolution." These divergent views
tend to heighten controversy at the local level and in state legislatures.2"
Competition between employee organizations also contributes to
militancy. When a union asks for majority support from a group of
employees so that it can be designated exclusive representative, it must
suggest that it can do more for the employees than its competitor. If
it fails to deliver, it can be voted out or, perhaps even worse from its
leadership's point of view, face internal upheaval. Consequently, a
public employees' organization is under virtually the same pressure
to constantly make gains for its members as is a union in the private
sector.29 The Baltimore City Classified Municipal Employees Associa-
tion, for example, recently removed a no-strike provision from its
by-laws because many of its members felt that "we could not compete
against the unions unless we did so.""
Unfortunately, public employee organizations have found that
striking is usually successful when other methods to achieve their
goals have failed.31 Anti-strike laws fail to deter the public employee
strike if the strikers feel that the issue is critical :" "Injunctions issued
under the no-strike provisions of the . . . Taylor Law are treated like
confetti by all the major municipal unions except police and fire, and
no one is sure how long these two will defer to the law."'3 3 As the late
Mike Quill, President of the New York City Transport Workers,
remarked about the anti-strike provisions of the Condon-Wadlin Act,34
the predecessor of the Taylor Act :3 "Let Mr. Condon collect the tokens
and Mr. Wadlin run the trains."
27. Note 26 supra.
28. This rivalry affects all government employee relations because teachers account
for roughly one-third of all government employees. The relative strength of either of
the two organizations is reflected in the legislation which has been passed by the states
covering teachers and other employees. Particularly interesting are the typically
teacher-like euphemisms which the NEA uses to describe various aspects of labor
relations. See note 26 supra.
29. This poses a basic question concerning the appropriateness of unionization in
the public sector. This question, however, is moot. See notes 50-53 infra and accom-
panying text. Nonetheless, a few states have attempted to prevent government em-
ployees from joining labor organizations. North Carolina, for example, prohibits
membership in labor unions by statute. In the section immediately following this
prohibition, North Carolina tacitly admits to the futility of such a prohibition by
further providing that agreements between labor organizations, which could of course
not exist if the employees obeyed the prohibition of the immediately preceding section,
and units of government are void. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-97, 95-98 (1965). Section
95-97 was, however, declared unconstitutionally overbroad in Atkins v. City of Char-
lotte, 37 U.S.L.W. 2517 (W.D. N.C. Feb. 25, 1969).
30. Interview with Mr. Harry Deitchman, President, Classified Municipal Em-
ployees Ass'n, Dec. 5, 1968.
31. Statement by the President of the New York City United Federation of
Teachers in Posey, The New Militancy of Public Employees, 28 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
111, 114 (1968) : "Perhaps it is a bad lesson to learn but the city has convinced us
that striking brings us gains we need and cannot get any other way."
32. Comment, The Strike and Its Alternatives in Public Employment, 1966 Wis.
L. REv. 549, 553-54. See also Waldman, Damage Actions and Other Remedies in the
Public Employee Strike, 20 N.Y.U. CONF. ON LABOR 259 (1968).
33. Raskin, Why New York is "Strike City", The New York Times, Dec. 22, 1968,
Magazine Section at 8, 32.
34. Ch. 790, § 108, [1958] N.Y. Laws 1007 (McKinney).
35. Ch. 392, [1967] N.Y. Laws 393 (McKinney).
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Even more disruptive and difficult to resolve than the economically
motivated strike is the strike clouded by issues of race, religion or public
policy."0 In addition, strikes in disregard of an employer's inability
to pay the wages demanded or resolve the issues presented will perhaps
become endemic in public employment . 7 In private industry, if worker
demands are unreasonable, the employer can, at least, theoretically,
either raise prices or go out of business. The option of raising prices
for the public employer is at best difficult and at worst impossible.
Further, government cannot go out of business. This is why the dis-
tinction between so-called proprietary and governmental functions is
valueless in terms of labor policy. No legitimate differentiation between
the two functions, in terms of employee rights, is possible because
certain proprietary activities may be more vital to the public health or
safety than certain purely governmental functions. The public, for
example, would certainly be more disturbed and inconvenienced by a
two week strike of transport workers than it would by a two week
strike of tax collectors.
In addition to the problem of the strike, there are fundamental
questions concerning the establishment and role of employee organiza-
tions. The first problem is unit determination.88 This may be the
subject of future litigation between the Classified Municipal Employees
Association and Baltimore City.8" The applicable Baltimore City ordi-
nance provides that personnel who receive cash payments for overtime
shall not be considered supervisory personnel for the purpose of unit
determination."° Certain city employees who do receive such overtime
payments are arguably supervisory personnel. Their exclusion by the
City Labor Commissioner from an election for exclusive representa-
tion between the Classified Municipal Employees Association and
36. A good example is the 1968 New York teachers strike. See TIME, Nov. 29,
1968, at 89; TIME, Nov. 1, 1968, at 20; TImt, Oct. 25, 1968, at 34, 52; NwSWSEK,
Nov. 25, 1968, at 98; NgwswxEK, Oct. 28, 1968, at 84. See also T4NTATIVE PLAN -
PARENTS COMMUNITY COUNCm, a racist hate sheet which the UFT alleged was being
distributed by their Negro opposition. The American Federation of Teachers has
apparently also become involved in the college student unrest. AFT picket signs were
being carried during the San Francisco State uprising. CBS News Broadcast, Dec.
12, 1968.
37. "The union leaders knew when they called the [1966 New York subway]
strike that their wage demands could not be met within the existing revenue structure
of the transit system." Posey, The New Militancy of Public Employees, 28 PUB.
ADMIN. Rxv. 111, 112 (1968). On Sept. 7, 1967, nearly 90% of the police and firemen
in Youngstown, Ohio, struck after their demand for a $1,200 across the board salary
increase was refused. Id. at 113. Ohio prohibits public employee strikes by statute.
OHIo RZv. COD ANN. §§ 4117.01-4117.05 (Page 1965). An organizer for AFL-CIO
Laborers International Union Local 1228 in Baltimore told the author that the city
paid under $4.00 an hour for certain jobs which in the private sector were worth $5.00
to $8.00 an hour. The organizer observed that "you can't make gains by striking" but
that "if there was no alternative, we would strike." He concluded, "if you go about
things the right way, there is no need for , . ." the strike. Interview, Dec. 5, 1968.
38. "The type of bargaining unit which is established will have a profound impact
on whether or not the collective bargaining process will work." Anderson, Selection
and Certification of Representatives in Public Employment, 20 N.Y.U. CONF. ON LABOR
277, 296 (1968).
39. Interview with Mr. Harry Deitchman, President, Classified Municipal Em-
ployees Ass'n, Dec. 5, 1968; Interview with Mr. Edward Gutman, Baltimore City
Labor Commissioner, Dec. 5, 1968.
40. Baltimore, Md., Ordinance No. 251 (1968).
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Local 44 of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees has been challenged by the C.M.E.A., which lost the election
by three votes. 4 '
The unit determination issue is only part of the larger problem of
union recognition.4" Exclusive recognition ". . . runs into strong con-
trary traditions of individual employee rights, civil service protec-
tionism, and representation by varied organizations with minority
support or specialized interests. ' '43 Even recognition which is not ex-
clusive presupposes at least tacit agreement by government to consider
employee viewpoints to a greater extent than they would be considered
without recognition. This practice is implicitly antagonistic to time-
honored concepts of sovereignty and the democratic process.44 The
fundamental basis of representative democracy is the election of repre-
sentatives by the people to formulate public policy. Union recogni-
tion and the negotiation which is recognition's natural concomitant
removes from electorate control matters which are the subject of bar-
gaining. 45 While government has the responsibility of determining
which areas of policy control it is willing to surrender to bilateral
negotiation, unionization in public employment has, unfortunately, pro-
ceeded with minimal government direction. Government has rarely
considered this responsibility beyond the slogan stage.46
In any case, once the decision is made to replace electorate control
in certain areas with bilateral negotiations, stress may occur in the
bargaining process over the basic question of negotiability.47 In New
York City, for example, the unions have proposed the elimination of
the Civil Service Commission's Career and Salary Plan which is part
and parcel of the city merit system and which is, thus, not supposed
41. Evening Sun (Baltimore), Nov. 27, 1968, § C, at 24, col. 1.
42. Between 1960 and 1965, strikes for recognition were the second largest cause
of work stoppages in public employment. Anderson, Selection and Certification of
Representatives in Public Employment, 20 N.Y.U. CONE. ON LABOR 277, 278 (1968).
43. Newland, Collective Bargaining Concepts: Applications in Governments, 28
Pun. ADMIN. RIv. 117, 122 (1968).
44. See generally Nigro, The Implications for Public Administration, 28 PUB.
ADMIN. Rv. 137 (1968).
45. See Dade County v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees, 157 So. 2d
176, 182 (Fla. App. 1963) (quoting with favor lower court opinion) :
The courts have said that as a general rule collective bargaining has no place
in government service. The employer is the whole people. This is a government
of law, not men. For the courts to hold otherwise . . . would be to sanction
control of government functions not by laws but by men. Such policy, if followed
to its logical conclusion, may inevitably lead to chaos.
Public control would be virtually eliminated if binding arbitration were used to
resolve disputes in government employment. See Sullivan, Binding Arbitration in
Public Employment Labor Disputes, 36 U. CINN. L. Rgv. 666 (1967): "It is the
control of these areas that the electorate in a democratic form of government will not
and should not relinquish."
46. Notes 23 & 24 supra and accompanying text. Recent state legislation and
discussion, however, is encouraging. See pp. 50-57 infra. See also Report of the
Committee on the Law of Government Employee Relations, ABA SECTION ON LABOR
LAW 175, 182-86 (1967). Nevertheless, even the report of the New York Taylor
Committee merely ". . . flatly states that it is against the policy of the State for public
employees to strike .. " Id. at 176 (1966). "The Taylor Act . . . within weeks
flunked its first test: the big New York City school strike [of 1967]." Nesvig, The
New Dimensions of the Strike Question, 28 PuB. ADMIN. Rgv. 126, 131 (1968).
47. Notes 62-63 infra.
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to be negotiable. 4' The conflict between bilateral negotiations and
merit systems is a very real one. It will continue under any scheme of
employee organization recognition.4 9
Nonetheless, political and practical realities in public employment
now pose the question of how to channel unionization, not whether it
can be avoided. 50 Organized public employees are becoming increas-
ingly powerful.5 ' Union leaders recognize that ". . . if the labor move-
ment is to grow, it must look to government employment as a prime
source of new members."52 Because of this, as former Secretary of
Labor W. Willard Wirtz remarked, ". . . some effective method of
bilateral and representational negotiations is 'inevitable, proper, and
desirable in public employment . . .' "" Unhappily, "[t]he success of
belligerence in America has set the stage. . . ,' If labor peace is to
be realized in public employment, the states must now by legislative
action minimize the danger of labor belligerence by establishing pro-
cedures for a dialogue and perhaps even a satisfactory conclusion.
THE FEDERAL PROGRAM
Executive Order 10988
On January 17, 1962, President John F. Kennedy signed Execu-
tive Order 10988, entitled "Employee-Management Cooperation in the
Federal Service." 55 The Order established a basic outline for govern-
ment employee relations. Three levels of union recognition are author-
ized: informal, formal and exclusive. Employee organizations granted
formal or exclusive recognition have certain guaranteed rights to
participate in the formulation of personnel policies. The Order does
not permit recognition of any organization which asserts the right to
strike or is subversive or corrupt. Employee-management agreements
within each agency may contain provisions for the resolution of im-
passes and grievances. Advisory but not compulsory arbitration is
permitted in unit determination disputes. Each agency is to formu-
late rules and regulations to control its employee relations. The
48. Nelson, Resolution of Impasses in the Government and Nonprofit Employment
Sector, 20 N.Y.U. CONp. ON LABOp 307, 311 (1968).
49. See Camp & Lomax, Bilateralism and the Merit Principle, 28 PUB. ADMIN.
Rgv. 132 (1968).
50. The situation in public employment today is strikingly parallel to the private
employment problems of the 1930's. As in the private sector: "If the states do not
perform well . . . they may face the prospect of federal legislation in this field."
McKelvey, The Role of State Agencies in Public Employee Labor Relations, 20 IND.
& LAB. RFL. REv. 179, 196 (1967). See also note 8 supra.
51. Goldberg, Labor-Management Relations Laws in Public Service, 91 MONTHLY
LAB. Rtv. 48 (June, 1968) : "[T]he total of organized public employees is a potent and
growing factor in the pluralistic structure of American society."
52. Donoian, The AFGE and the AFSCME: Labor's Hope for the Future?, 18
LAB. L.J. 727 (1967).
53. McKelvey, The Role of State Agencies in Public Employee Labor Relations,
20 IND. & LAB. REL. Rev. 179 (1967).
54. Posey, The New Militancy of Public Employees, 28 PUB. ADMIN. RZv. 111,
117 (1968).
55. Exec. Order No. 10,988, 27 Fed. Reg. 551 (1962).
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agency heads possess almost unlimited discretion in matters of labor
policy. 6 Federal employees, regardless of any negotiated agreement,
may bring matters of personal concern to the attention of their superiors
and may choose their own representatives in any grievance action.
Problems Under the Order
As of August, 1966, 1,054,417 employees of the Executive Branch,
or approximately 38 per cent of the total employment of that branch,
were in exclusive bargaining units.57 One hundred and eleven employee
organizations are informally, formally, or exclusively recognized by the
federal government." Although the federal experience is not an exact
parallel of the state and local situation, the problems which have arisen
under the Order are indicative of similar difficulties at other levels
of government.
One of the earliest controversies arose from union objections to
the requirement, imposed by the President's Temporary Committee on
the Implementation of the Federal Employee-Management Relations
Program, that sixty per cent of eligible employees participate in elections
for exclusive representation.59 Because federal agencies schedule elec-
tions so that employees can conveniently vote, the sixty per cent rule is
not as significant as it might be. Nonetheless, there are still instances of
minority unions urging employees not to vote in order to prevent the
vote from reaching sixty per cent,6" and the controversy appears to be
continuing.61
There were early fears that negotiations would not be meaningful
due to the limited scope of negotiable matters. These fears have proved
unfounded.62 On many occasions, however, unions have attempted to
56. For a discussion of the "Standards of Conduct for Employee Organizations"
and "Code of Fair Labor Practices" which were prepared pursuant to the Order, see
Wallerstein, Labor Relations in Public Employment - The Federal Experience, 19
N.Y.U. CoNv. ON LABOR 205, 209-10 (1967) ; Report of the Committee on the Law of
Government Employee Relations, ABA SXc'rION ON LABOR LAW 175, 176-78 (1967).
57. Report of the Committee on the Law of Government Employee Relations,
ABA StcTION ON LABOR LAW 175 (1967).
58. Id. at 176.
59. Report of the Committee on the Law of Government Employee Relations,
ABA SWCTION ON LABOR LAW 355 (1964). See also note 61 infra.
60. Wallerstein, Labor Relations in Public Employment - The Federal Experi-
ence, 19 N.Y.U. CoNr. ON LABOR 205, 218 (1967).
61. Report of the Committee on the Law of Government Employee Relations,
ABA SecTioN ON LABOR LAW 130, 136-37 (1966). The unions urge that the 60%
rule is inequitable because it creates ". . . inconsistencies in procedures dealing with
elections in the private and governmental sectors." The 60% requirement has caused
problems in two run-off elections and has been eliminated in the run-off situation by
Civil Service Commission Regulation. Statement of Louis P. Poulton, Id. at 140.
The ABA Committee recommends the complete abolition of the rule. Mr. Donald H.
Wollett, national counsel of the NEA and a member of the Committee, opposes the
elimination of the 60% rule and believes that the "inconsistency argument" is not
persuasive. Statement of Donald H. Wollett, Id. The 60% rule has been upheld in
the courts. Manhattan-Bronx Postal Union v. Gronouski, 350 F.2d 451 (D.C.
Cir. 1965).
62. Wallerstein, Labor Relations in Public Employment - The Federal Experi-
ence, 19 N.Y.U. CONF. ON LABOR 205, 211 (1967).
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bargain on non-negotiable matters. Further, many impasses have oc-
curred because of agency determination that an issue is not negotiable.6"
Resolution of impasses creates perhaps the most difficulty:
The problem of impasses in the process of negotiations has appar-
ently created a great deal of frustration for all parties concerned.
The absence of the right to strike ... has left unions . . .with the
feeling that they are at the mercy of the agencies in pressing their
bargaining demands .... In addition . . .very few collective bar-
gaining agreements make provision for deadlocks in negotiations. 4
Consequently, some unions have suggested that binding or advisory
arbitration be substituted for the strike.65 Nevertheless, the Presi-
dential Task Force on Employee-Management Relations in the Federal
Service took the position that ". . . arbitration of negotiation impasses
is not an appropriate technique for general adoption by the Federal
Government at this time."6 6 The Task Force instead recommended
that each agency by negotiation devise impasse resolution techniques
to fit its own circumstances.6 7  This recommendation has not been
implemented. 8  In addition, ". . .most of the government agencies
still will not allow an outsider to be involved in collective bargaining
negotiations." 69
The most critical problem in the early days of the Order was unit
determination.70 Agency heads tended to substitute their own judg-
ment for that of their negotiators.7 They have the power to indulge
in this kind of second guessing because Section 7 of the Order provides
63. Report of the Committee on the Law of Government Employee Relations,
ABA SECTION ON LABOR LAW 178-79 (1967).
64. Id. at 134. One member of the Committee, Robert G. Howlett, Chairman of
the Michigan Labor Mediation Board, does not feel that unions are at the mercy of
management, noting that under the Michigan Act local employees do not feel at the
mercy of their employers. Id. at 138. The Committee recommends that Civil Service
Commission guidelines and Secretary of Labor publications urge the inclusion of
impasse resolution procedures in negotiated agreements.
65. Report of the Committee on the Law of Government Employee Relations,
ABA SECTION ON LABOR LAW 362 (1964). There has been a reluctance on the part
of some unions, however, to make use of advisory arbitration as a final impasse resolu-
tion procedure as provided in Section 8b of the Order. Since the inception of the
program, there have been only eighteen cases of advisory grievance arbitration. The
arbitrators have supported the employee position eight times and the management
viewpoint the other ten. Report of the Committee on the Law of Government Em-
ployee Relations, ABA SECTION ON LABOR LAW 180 (1967).
66. Report of the Committee on the Law of Government Employee Relations,
ABA SEcTION ON LABOR LAW 362 (1964). In addition, Section 8b of the Order has
been interpreted to prohibit advisory arbitration in the negotiation of contracts. Report
of the Committee on the Law of Government Employee Relations, ABA SEcrIoN ON
LABOR LAW 135 (1966).
67. Report of the Committee on the Law of Government Employee Relations,
ABA SECTIoN ON LABOR LAW 362 (1964). The few impasse procedures which have
been adopted provide for mediation, fact-finding, and higher level discussion. Id. at 363.
68. Note 64 supra and accompanying text.
69. Report of the Committee on the Law of Government Employee Relations,
ABA SEC'rTON ON LABOR LAW 178 (1967). An outsider has a very difficult job in
mediating disputes in federal employment because he must become familiar with a
wide range of federal, agency and installation regulations. Id. at 180. See e.g., text
accompanying notes 77-78 infra.
70. Wallerstein, Labor Relations in Public Employment - The Federal Experi-
ence, 19 N.Y.U. CONI. ON LABOR 205, 212 (1967).
71. Report of the Committee on the Law of Government Employee Relations,
ABA SECTION ON LABOR LAW 361-62 (1964).
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that they must approve "[a]ny basic or initial agreement. ' 72 Even
though the Order does provide for ad hoc arbitration in unit determina-
tion cases, this advisory arbitration has not been a uniform success.73
Most of the arbitrators feel that decisions of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board in similar cases should be taken into consideration but
should not be controlling. Because the arbitrators are not required to
follow any precedent, "no body of authoritative law on unit determina-
tion has developed."71 4 Certain kinds of units can be established in most
agencies without arbitration. Some agencies, however, will not grant
recognition to any type of unit, except an overall unit, without arbitra-
tion. 71 Contributing to the unit determination dilemma is the yet un-
resolved issue concerning the participation of supervisory employees in
employee organizations.78
Because each agency is responsible for conducting its own em-
ployee relations, "pyramids of regulations ' 77 have developed. The
Department of Defense, for example, would issue a regulation. The
Navy Department would issue an interpretative regulation. Then the
Navy Bureau of Personnel would issue an interpretative regulation on
the interpretative regulation, and then each installation under the Bureau
of Personnel would issue another interpretative regulation. "The fact
of the matter is that you would not recognize the original regulation
issued by the Department of Defense."'78
The "Code of Fair Labor Practices" for federal employment is
similar to private labor standards except in the area of enforcement. 79
The ". . . first unfair labor practice case where the charges of a union
were found meritorious and some of the recommendations of the hear-
72. Exec. Order No. 10,988, § 7, 27 Fed. Reg. 551 (1962). See also McKelvey,
The Role of State Agencies in Public Employee Labor Relations, 20 IND. & LAB. RzL.
REv. 179, 179-80 (1967):
What is most remarkable about the Executive Order is its emphasis on decen-
tralization and agency autonomy. With the exception of Section 11 . . . the
individual agencies are free of independent regulation in their dealings with em-
ployee organizations, their relationships being guided only by the Standards of
Conduct . . . and the Code of Fair Labor Practices suggested for voluntary
adoption ....
73. Exec. Order No. 10,988, § 11, 27 Fed. Reg. 555 (1962). There have been
thirty-three decisions by arbitrators under this section. Report of the Committee on
the Law of Government Employee Relations, ABA SEcTION ON LABOR LAW 131 (1966).
74. Report of the Committee on the Law of Government Employee Relations,
ABA SECTION ON LABOR LAW 179 (1967). See also McKelvey, The Role of State
Agencies in Public Employee Labor Relations, 20 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 179,
181 (1967).
75. Report of the Committee on the Law of Government Employee Relations,
ABA SECrION ON LABOR LAW 179 (1967).
76. Report of the Committee on the Law of Government Employee Relations,
ABA SECTION ON LABOR LAW 138, 141 (1966).
77. Id. at 137.
78. Id. at 138.
79. See note 56 supra. The unions have objected to the Code of Fair Labor
Practices because in their view the Code procedures make each agency the prosecutor,
defender, and judge. They feel that the agencies will not be objective. As the ABA
Committee on the Law of Government Employee Relations has suggested, "These
attitudes cannot be discounted." Report of the Committee on the Law of Government
Employee Relations, ABA SECTION ON LABOR LAW 355, 364 (1964). See also Report
of the Committee on the Law of Government Employee Relations, ABA SEcrION ON




ing officer implemented . . ." involved the National Federation of
Federal Employees and the Comptroller of Currency in the Treasury
Department."° The dispute began in November, 1964, when the union
began to seek recognition. The Comptroller delayed recognition until
March, 1966. Shortly thereafter two of the union officers were trans-
ferred from New York to distant parts; six months later recognition
was revoked. The Secretary of the Treasury accepted the findings of
the hearing officer, transferred the officers back to New York, and re-
stored recognition."' In other cases in which unfair labor practices
have been charged, there has been either ". . . informal settlement or
complete rejection of the charges by management without .. .meet-
ings or hearings. '8 2
Tension between civil service concepts and collective negotiations
has also been a problem: "Some of the unions have in effect pushed
for seniority as the major consideration in promotions, and this cannot
be reconciled with merit." 8 An accommodation of the merit concept
with the principle of bargaining will require at the federal level, as in
the states, mutual good faith and probably much more. 4 In short,
although the structural defects of the federal program s5 have caused
problems in and of themselves, the federal experience, if used as a guide
for similar action on the state level, indicates that a resolution of these
structural defects must be accompanied by a willingness on the part
of both labor and management to appreciate the other's position.
STATE PROGRAMS
Florida, in spite of several strikes within recent years, 0 clings
to the traditional approach :"7 employee organizations and their rela-
tions with government are not regulated. By statute, government em-
ployees may belong to organizations which do not assert the right to
strike and such organizations may present proposals.88 This type of
80. Report of the Committee on the Law of Government Employee Relations,
ABA SncrioN ON LABOR LAW 177-78 (1967).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 178. Legislation has been proposed in Congress to establish a Federal
Employees Relations Board, but it has not made any progress. Report of the Com-
mittee on the Law of Government Employee Relations, ABA StC'rION ON LABOR LAW
137 (1966). The ABA Committee has suggested that the lack of such a board is a
"fundamental deficiency" in the Order. See Report of the Committee on the Law of
Government Employee Relations, ABA StctION ON LABOR LAW (1964).
83. Camp & Lomax, Bilateralism and the Merit Principle, 28 PuB. ADMIN. RXv.
132, 134 (1968).
84. Notes 47-49 supra and accompanying text.
85. The federal agencies have also been somewhat disturbed by the amount of
time consumed by employee relations. See Wallerstein, Labor Relations in Public
Employment - The Federal Experience, 19 N.Y.U. CONF. ON LABOR 205, 219 (1967).
See generally Hart, The Impasse in Labor Relations in the Federal Service, 19 IND.
& LAB. REL. Rzv. 175 (1966) ; Macy, The Federal Employee-Management Cooperation
Program, 19 IND. & LAB. REL. RiV. 549 (1966).
86. For example, a teachers strike occurred recently in Ft. Lauderdale and a mass
resignation took place in Miami. See Nesvig, The New Dimensions of the Strike
Question, 28 PUB. ADMIN. Rev. 126, 131 (1968).
87. The most traditional approach of course would be not to permit employees to
join labor unions at all. Alabama, with certain exceptions, takes this view. ALA. CODE
tit. 55, §§ 317-317(4) (1960 & 1967 Supp.). This legislation is probably in violation
of the federal Constitution. See notes 11 & 29 supra.
88. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 839.221 (1965).
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statute does not provide procedures for even minimal dialogue between
employees and government.89
Delaware recently enacted legislation vesting authority in its
Department of Labor and Industrial Relations to regulate state and
local employer-employee relations.9" The Department may make regu-
lations to administer the program,9 ' which, among other things,
establishes procedures for exclusive recognition. Public employers are
required to engage in collective bargaining9 2 and, if an agreement can-
not be reached, either party may submit "... any matter in dispute,
except matters of wages and salaries . . . to the State Mediation
Service ". . . or, by agreement of the parties, to arbitration. ... '"" The
statute fails to provide for a run-off election if no employee organiza-
tion receives a majority of the votes cast in a secret ballot for exclusive
representation. In fact, if no employee organization receives a majority,
"no election to determine representation within the unit shall be held
within 1 year thereof."94 Delaware also prohibits strikes,95 and the
merit or personnel system, where applicable, controls over any demands
for seniority treatment by employee organizations.96
The 1968 Session of the Maryland General Assembly enacted pro-
cedures for state labor relations with teachers.97 The statute provides
that the public school employer in each county "shall designate ...
which, if any, employee organization shall be the exclusive representa-
tive. . . ."'8 Only two employee units are permitted in each county, 99
probably to avoid the possibility of having to negotiate with a number
of employee units. An employee organization may request certification
if it has a membership of at least thirty per cent of the total employees
in a specified unit.' Interestingly enough, elections to determine repre-
sentation are to be held only between June 1 and June 15. The organi-
zation which receives the largest number of votes - there is apparently
no majority requirement - is to be the exclusive representative.''
89. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 215.1 (Purden 1964); ORE. Rgv. STAT.§§ 243.710-243.780 (1967). Pennsylvania has, however, recently granted policemen
and firemen the right to bargain. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 217.1 (Purden Supp. 1969).
90. DxL. ANN. CODX tit. 19, ch. 13, §§ 1301-13 (Supp. 1966). Teachers are not
included. Id. at § 1301(3)(b).
91. Id. at § 1308.
92. Id. at § 1309.
93. Id. at § 1310.
94. Id. at § 1307.
95. Id. at § 1313: "No public employee shall strike while in the performance of
his official duties."
96. Id. at § 1312.
97. MD. ANN. COng art. 77, § 175 (Supp. 1968). The states of Washington and
Rhode Island, for example, also have statutes specifically for professional educational
employees. WASH. Rsv. COng ANN. §§ 28.72.010-28.72.090 (Supp. 1968); R.I. GZN.
LAWS §§ 28-9.3-1 to 28-9.3-16 (1969).
98. MD. ANN. COnE art. 77, § 175(d) (Supp. 1968). The statute required that
the county public schools make their designation before June 15, 1968. Baltimore City
was given until June 15, 1969, to designate exclusive representatives, probably because
Baltimore City already had a program for teacher organization, Baltimore, Md.,
Ordinance 1031 (1967), which the state act superseded.
99. MD. ANN. CODE art. 77, § 175(d) (Supp. 1968).
100. Id. at § 175 (e) (1). Another employee organization with a 10%5 membership
in the unit may request an election. Id. at § 175 (e) (2). The State Board of Education
is responsible for adopting rules and regulations to verify the number of certified
employees. Id. at § 175(e) (5).
101. Id. at § 175(e) (5).
1969]
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Under the Maryland arrangement, the employer is required to
meet with and negotiate with the exclusive representative of the em-
ployees." 2 The impasse resolution procedures, however, are minimal.
If an impasse in negotiation occurs, both parties must request the
assistance of the State Board of Education if they wish that body to
mediate.' If both parties do not consent to such a request, then, at
the request of either party, what is essentially a panel of mediators may
be named. One mediator is to be chosen by each party and the third
is to be selected by the other two within ten days.' The problem
with this type of mediation is that the employee organizations may
feel that the State Board of Education is somewhat biased. In addi-
tion, because in Maryland the local boards of education establish
educational policy while the county councils set the budgets, negotia-
tions between employees and school boards are meaningless on any
financial matter unless the county councils are willing to appropriate
the funds. The statute and its impasse resolution procedures do not
meet this problem.0 5
California provides separately for teacher representation' 6 and for
representation of other government employees." 7 The most unusual
102. Id. at § 175(h) (1): The employer must meet with the exclusive employee
organization "upon request" and discuss "salaries, wages, hours, and other working
conditions." Id. at § 175(h) (2): "The term 'negotiate' as used herein shall include
the duty to confer in good faith, at all reasonable times, and to reduce to writing the
matters agreed upon as the result of such negotiations."
103. Id. at § 175(i).
104. Id. Either the State Board of Education or the mediators must make a report
within 30 days from the date of the request for mediation. Costs of mediation are to
be shared. The 30-day requirement seems to be an inordinately short length of time
particularly if the two mediators representing the parties cannot agree on a third.
No alternative procedure for choosing the third mediator is provided in cases in which
the party-appointed mediators fail to agree.
105. There is already a great deal of frustration in Maryland as a result of this
divided educational policy making and budget making authority. A county commis-
sioner in one Maryland county in a private conversation with the author suggested
that "The Superintendent of Schools is doing his best to bankrupt the county." The
statute recognizes this divided authority in its provision that school boards shall have
the final determination over all matters which have been negotiated, "But this final
determination shall be subject to .. . , the fiscal relationship between the public school
employer and the county commissioners .... ." MD. ANN. CoDE art. 77, § 175(k)
(Supp. 1968). If an employee organization should become frustrated by this bifurcated
authority and call a strike, its designation as exclusive representative would be re-
voked. Id. at § 175(1). What this revocation would really accomplish in terms of
assisting harmonious employer-employee relations is questionable.
106. CAL. Enuc. CODE §§ 13080-13088 (West 1969). The ABA Committee has
remarked:
Experience under this statute, if it survives for any length of time, will put to a
severe test, in the educational context, some of the cherished private sector notions
concerning the necessity for exclusive representation, the need for impartial estab-
lishment and adjudication of rules and procedures for determination of representa-
tion and conduct of bargaining, and the wisdom of bargaining units limited to rank
and file membership. However, as of this writing, the legislation is under strenuous
attack from the AFT and its supporters; several court cases are pending to test
various aspects of the law. Evidence to date on the operation of the law in school
districts in California is inconclusive. Negotiating councils (with little AFT repre-
sentation) are operating throughout the state. However, no bilateral, written agree-
ments of any consequence between teacher organizations and boards of education
have yet been negotiated, and none are required by the statute.
Report of the Committee on the Law of Government Employee Relations, ABA
SECTION ON LABOR LAW 130, 151 (1966).
107. CAL. GOVT COD §§ 3500-3509 (West 1966 & Supp. 1969).
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feature of the educational employees provision is its establishment of
proportional representation on "negotiating councils."' 108 The pro-
visions for other employees are somewhat similar to the federal model.
Public employees are granted the right to join employee organizations..
in the interest of strengthening ". . merit, civil service and other
methods of administering employer-employee relations through the
establishment of uniform and orderly methods of communication .... ,110
The statute applies to all levels of government."' Upon request, public
agency officials ". . . shall meet and confer . . . with representatives of
recognized employee organizations . . . and shall consider fully such
presentations as are made by the employee organization on behalf of
its members prior to arriving at a determination of policy or course
of action. 1" 2 Recent amendments to the California statute provide for
collective bargaining, permit exclusive recognition, and attempt to
supply a mechanism for impasse resolution." 3 However, these amend-
ments are not applicable to state employees." 4
Although Connecticut, like California, provides different pro-
cedures for teachers than for other public employees, it provides
explicit procedures for certain other government labor relations."' The
Connecticut statute permits exclusive representation of educational
personnel in units composed of employees below the rank of superin-
tendent." 6 Supervisory personnel may be represented by their own
organization or included in a unit composed of other employees."'
The statute is unusual in its provision for binding arbitration in one
area: "Any dispute as to the eligibility of personnel to vote in an elec-
tion, or the.agency to conduct the election . . . [for exclusive repre-
sentation] shall be submitted to a board of arbitration for a binding
decision with respect thereto.""' 8
108. CAL. EDUC. COD § 13085 (West 1969):
An employee organization representing certificated employees shall be entitled
to appoint such number of members of the negotiating council as bears as nearly
as practicable the same ratio to the total number of members of the negotiating
council as the number of members of the employee organization bears to the total
number of certificated employees of the public school employer who are members
of employee organizations representing certificated employees.
Although the statute states that employee organizations may represent their members
on "all matters relating to employment conditions," Id. at § 13084, there is no pro-
vision for exclusive representation for teachers.
109. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3502 (West Supp. 1969).
110. Id. at § 3500.
111. Id. at § 3501(c).
112. Id. at § 3505. "The scope of representation shall include all matters relating
to employment conditions .. " Id. at § 3504.
113. CAL. GOVTr CODE §§ 3505, 3505.2 (West Supp. 1969).
114. Id. at § 3510.
115. See generally CONN. GEN. STArT. ANN. §§ 10-153a to 10-153f (1967 & Supp.
1969) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-467 to 7-478 (Supp. 1969).
116. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-153b (Supp. 1969). In the absence of exclusive
recognition of a majority organization, all employee organizations are to receive equal
treatment. Id. at § 10-153d.
117. Id. at § 10-153b (b).
118. Id. at § 10-153c. The board of arbitration is to be composed of persons named
by the employee organizations and the school board so that each side has an equal
number; an impartial member is then selected by the already selected arbitrators. Such




Each school board is required to negotiate any issues which an
employee organization wishes to discuss."' The secretary of the state
board of education is to mediate any disagreements, 2 ° and, if the secre-
tary fails to resolve any dispute, it is to be submitted to a board of
three arbitrators (one chosen by each side and the third impartial)
for advisory arbitration.121 No further impasse resolution techniques
are provided.
Connecticut prohibits strikes by its teachers in a most interesting
manner: "No certificated professional employee shall, in an effort to
effect a settlement of any salary disagreement with his employing
board of education, engage in any strike or concerted refusal to render
services.' 22 The italicized limitation on the strike prohibition indi-
cates that strikes not concerning salaries are not prohibited. Conse-
quently, without violating the statute, Connecticut teachers apparently
can strike over any number of issues, such as school decentralization,
length of lunch periods, and perhaps even hours of work required.
Although Connecticut makes no provision for state employees, it
does provide for municipal employee relations. 2 3 Municipal employees
"... shall have ... the right ... to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing . . . and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection . "... ,,2 The State Board of Labor Relations is given
broad powers under the statute, including the power to designate exclu-
sive representatives, 2 ' following secret elections if necessary, to resolve
unit determination disputes, and to hold hearings on complaints of
prohibited practices.' 26 In prohibited practices cases the Board may
issue cease and desist orders.2 7
At the request of both the municipal employer and the employee
organization the State Board of Mediation and Arbitration may mediate
impasses and grievances.128 Either the employer or the employee
organization, however, may petition the State Board of Mediation and
Arbitration for a fact-finding if, "after a reasonable period of negotia-
tion over the terms of an agreement," a dispute has not been resolved.'29
Under the Connecticut scheme, all negotiated agreements must
be reduced to writing. A request for funds necessary to implement an
119. Id. at § 10-153d:
[S]uch duty shall include the obligation of such board of education to meet at
reasonable times, including meetings appropriately related to the budget-making
process, and confer in good faith with respect to salaries and other conditions of
employment, or the negotiation of any agreement . . . but such obligation shall
not . . . require the making of a concession.
120. Id. at § 10-153f(a).
121. Id. at § 10-153f(b).
122. Id. at § 10-153e (emphasis added).
123. CONN. GtN. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-467 to 7-478 (Supp. 1969).
124. Id. at § 7-468(a).
125. Id. at § 7-468(b).
126. Prohibited practices for both employers and employees are listed in CONN.
GtN. STAT. ANN. § 7-470 (Supp. 1969). One of the prohibited practices is refusal
to bargain in good faith.
127. Id. at § 7-471.
128. Id. at § 7-472. The state board of mediation and arbitration is required to
submit its report at least 20 days prior to the budget adoption date.
129. Id. at § 7-473.
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agreement is to be submitted by the municipal negotiator to the
municipal legislative authority within fourteen days after the agreement
is reached.'8 0 Furthermore, if the public employer has "sole and ex-
clusive control" over its employees, then it is empowered ". . to enter
into collective bargaining agreements . . . and such agreements shall
be binding on the parties thereto, and no such agreement or any part
thereof shall require approval of the legislative body of the munici-
pality."'1 3 ' The statute also provides:
Where there is a conflict between any agreement reached by a
municipal employer and an employee organization ... on matters
appropriate to collective bargaining132 ... and any charter, special
act, ordinance, rules or regulations adopted by the municipal em-
ployer or its agents such as a personnel board or civil service
commission, or any general statute directly regulating the hours of
work of policemen or firemen, or any general statute providing
for the method of covering or removing employees from coverage
under the Connecticut municipal employees retirement system, the
terms of such agreement shall prevail.' 3
Massachusetts makes separate provision for state 34 and local 135
employees. In 1967, the statute covering state employees was com-
pletely revised. Employee organizations and agency heads, by mutual
agreement and subject to the approval of the Director of Personnel
and Standardization, now may establish collective bargaining units
"based upon community of interest."'3 6 An employee organization is
required to show "written evidence" that more than fifty per cent of
the employees in a unit wish to be represented by it. The organization
is designated as the exclusive representative unless another group chal-
lenges its designation. If there is a challenge, the Labor Relations
Commission conducts an election.' A run-off election is held if no
organization receives a majority. 138
130. Id. at § 7-474. Section 7-474(c) provides:
Notwithstanding any provision of any general statute, charter, special act or
ordinance to the contrary, the budget-appropriating authority of any municipal
employer shall appropriate whatever funds are required to comply with a collective
bargaining agreement, provided the request called for in subsection (b) of this
section has been approved by the legislative body of such municipal employer.
131. Id. at § 7-474(d).
132. Apparently the only items not the subject of collective bargaining are civil
service exams and ratings. Id. at § 7-474(f). Also, a collective bargaining agreement
presumably could not include a right to strike because "strikes are prohibited."
Id. at § 7-475.
133. Id. at § 7-474(f).
134. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 178F (Supp. 1968).
135. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, §§ 178G-178N (Supp. 1968).
136. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 178F(3) (Supp. 1968). If a unit agreement is
not reached within a "reasonable time" and in no case longer than 60 days after request,
such lack of agreement constitutes a dispute and ". . . the parties involved shall use
the services of the Labor Relations Commission to resolve such dispute."
137. Id. at § 178F(4). The 50% requirement is unusually high. The usual per-
centage of interest requirement is 30%. See, e.g., DtL. CODs ANN. tit. 19, § 1305(Supp. 1966).
138. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 149, § 178F(5) (Supp. 1968). Like most other state
statutes, once an employee organization receives recognition it is binding and not
subject to challenge for one year. Id. at § 178F(4).
1969]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
The Commonwealth has the duty of bargaining in good faith in
negotiating written agreements, but the statute provides that "...
neither party shall be compelled to agree to a proposal or to make a
concession."'1 39  Further: "If, after a reasonable period of negotiation,
a dispute exists between a department or agency head and an employee
organization over the terms of an agreement, either party or the parties
jointly may petition the director of personnel and standardization to
initiate procedures for fact finding."' 4 °
The Massachusetts statute delineates prohibited practices of both
labor and management.' 4 ' The Labor Relations Commission is author-
ized to investigate any complaint of prohibited practices and issue
findings of fact.'4 ' The Director of Personnel and Standardization,
subject to the approval of the Commissioner of Administration, makes
the necessary rules for the administration of the statute. 43
Sections 178G-178N of the statute establish a program for
Massachusetts municipal labor relations. 44 Municipal employees are
granted the right to bargain collectively over wages, hours and other
conditions of employment. 45  Prior to employee organization recog-
nition, the State Labor Relations Commission holds a hearing4 . to
determine whether or not "there is a controversy concerning the repre-
sentation of employees."' 4 7 If a controversy exists, the Commission
conducts an election or arrives at another "suitable method" for de-
termining representation. The Labor Relations Commission is also
responsible for deciding "in each case . . . the appropriate unit for pur-
poses of collective bargaining ... ""s
Both sides have the duty to bargain collectively and "... in good
faith with respect to wages, hours and other conditions of employ-
ment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising
thereunder . . .,I If any provision of an agreement conflicts with
139. Id. at § 178F(6).
140. Id. at § 178F(7). The procedures are described therein.
141. Employer prohibited practices are outlined in § 178F(8). Employee prohibited
practices, including engaging in, inducing, or encouraging strikes, are designated in
§ 178F(9).
142. Id. at § 178F(10). Also included in this section is a prohibition against in-
dividual employees striking.
143. Id. at § 178F(11).
144. § 178G defines the terms of the statute. By a 1966 amendment, police have the
same rights as other municipal employees.
145. Id. at § 178H(1).
146. The hearing may be waived by the employer and "an employee organization"
so that a "consent election" is conducted by the Commission to determine a repre-
sentation question. Id. at § 178H(5). This section seems to indicate that only one of
several competing employee organizations plus the employer need waive the hearing
for a "consent election" to be held.
147. Id. at § 178H(3). If there is no controversy, the employee organization
seeking recognition is simply certified as the exclusive representative. There is pro-
vision for run-off elections.
148. Id. at § 178H(4) "... provided . .. that no unit shall include both pro-
fessional and nonprofessional employees unless a majority of such professional em-
ployees vote for inclusion in such unit."
149. Id. at § 178-I. The bargaining representative of the municipality with all
employee organizations except those representing school employees is the chief execu-
tive officer or his representative. In bargaining with an employee organization repre-
senting school employees, the municipal employer is to be represented by the "school
committee" or its representatives. The bargaining sessions must be at reasonable times
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"any law, ordinance, or by-law" then such law, ordinance or by-law
"shall prevail."15  If the parties cannot reach agreement after a reason-
able time or "sixty days prior to the final date for setting the municipal
budget, either party or the parties jointly may petition the state board
of conciliation and arbitration to initiate fact finding."' 5 ' The fact
finder may hold hearings, request the Board to issue subpoenas if
necessary, administer oaths and make written findings of fact within
sixty days of appointment. 5 ' The Board of Conciliation and Arbitra-
tion is also available, apparently at the request of either party, to
conciliate grievances and contract disputes and to arbitrate disputes
over the terms or application of an agreement.1 53
The statute lists prohibited labor and management practices. "4
A complaint of a prohibited practice is made to the Labor Relations
Commission which, after a hearing, may either dismiss the complaint
or issue a cease and desist order. The Commission may revoke the
"certification of an employee organization established by or assisted
in its establishment by any such prohibited practice."' 5  Striking is
specifically declared to be unlawful.5 6
A PROPOSAL FOR THE STATES
There are many different governmental approaches to public em-
ployment. The primary interest underlying all of these labor relations
"appropriately related to the budget making process." If funds are necessary to imple-
ment an agreement, ". . . a request for the necessary appropriations shall be submitted
to the legislative body. If such request is rejected, the matter shall be returned to
the parties for further bargaining." In addition, ". . . neither party shall be compelled
to agree to a proposal or to make a concession, and no .. .written contract shall
exceed a term of three years." Providing that no party shall be compelled to agree to
a proposal or make a concession is a neat way of retaining sovereignty on paper.
Whether it will work in practice is another matter. Further, there seems to be no
good reason why the parties should be prevented from making contracts in excess
of three years.
150. Id.
151. Id. at § 178J(a). The board is to submit to the parties a list "of three
qualified distinterested persons" from which the parties are to select a fact finder. If
the parties fail to agree on a fact finder within 5 days, the board is to appoint him.
Id. at § 178J(b).
152. Id. at § 178J (c). The hearings are to be "conducted in accordance with rules
established by the board .. " The expense of fact finding is divided equally between
the employer and the employee organization. Id. at § 178J (e). The fact finder may
attempt to mediate the dispute if he wishes. Id. at § 178J(f). The difference, of
course, between fact finding and mediation is that the fact finder attempts to determine
which points made by each party are valid whereas the mediator attempts to resolve
the dispute irrespective of which side is correct.
153. Id. at § 178K. Other arbitration tribunals are also permitted.
154. Id. at § 178L. The prohibited practices, which are fairly typical, are as
follows: Employers cannot (1) interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees "in the
free exercise" of their rights to organize; (2) dominate or interfere with an employee
organization; (3) discharge or discriminate against an employee because he has com-
plained; (4) refuse to bargain collectively in good faith; or (5) refuse to discuss
grievances. Employee organizations cannot (1) restrain or coerce a municipal em-
ployer in the selection of its representatives or (2) refuse to bargain in good faith.
155. Id. If a party refuses to bargain (perhaps if it refuses to bargain in good
faith) the "commission shall order fact finding and direct the party at fault to pay
the full costs thereof."
156. Id. at § 178M: "It shall be unlawful for any employee to engage in, induce,




programs is to provide the public with uninterrupted government
service. Provision of uninterrupted services, however, is a hope, not a
reality. In fact, "[s]trikes of public employees will continue whether
they are legal or illegal, whether there are sanctions or no sanctions,
until such time as effective substitutes are provided as a channel
for . . ."17 employee protest and pressure.
The ideal public employment arrangement would provide an alter-
native to the strike which would assure sovereignty for the govern-
ment, continuation of public services and democratic control for the
people, and adequate redress of grievances for public employees. Such
an alternative may be the limited strike. 158 A strike of this nature
would be permitted only after attempts at mediation and/or fact-finding
have failed. Such a scheme would permit strikes by a certain per-
centage of employees in any bargaining unit which cannot satisfactorily
resolve an impasse. For example, a small percentage of the persons
in any unit composed of policemen or firemen might be permitted to
strike, i.e., to refuse to report for work during their normal working
hours and to picket or otherwise engage in activities which normally
accompany a strike. In other areas of public employment, the percent-
age of persons in each unit who could strike would be established on
the basis of the importance of the unit to the public health and safety.
Of course public employees not engaging in the limited strike would not
be permitted to observe picket lines or strike in sympathy. Private
sector employees, however, would have the right to observe picket lines.
The limited strike should be permitted to last only for a designated
length of time, such as sixty days. At the expiration of that period,
if an unresolved dispute involves municipal employees, it should be
submitted to the appropriate legislative body for final solution. In the
case of state employees, disputes should be submitted to the governor
or state legislature for final determination. Such a dispute should not
be submitted to binding arbitration or other compulsory third party
solutions. While these solutions are appropriate in the private sector
of employment, public labor disputes, like public election disputes, ques-
tions of public policy, and appropriations of public funds, are too
crucial to the public welfare to be left to the discretion of third parties
who may not be sufficiently sensitive to the public interest.
A limited strike would focus public attention on a dispute, demon-
strate the depth of employee feeling, and, to a limited extent, inconveni-
ence the public employer. Combined with its application of legitimate
employee pressure, such a regulated strike might supply the necessary
focus and compulsion to settle disputes without total disruption of
government services.
Jonathan L. Alpert
157. Zack, Are Strikes of Public Employees Necessary?, 53 A.B.A.J. 808, 810
(1967).
158. Other alternative solutions to the public employee strike, such as those of
Professors Oberer and Doherty and Michigan's Romney Committee, have been pro-
posed. See Report of the Committee on the Law of Government Employee Relations,
ABA SEcTIoN ON LABOR LAW 175, 182-86 (1967). It is submitted, however, that these
procedures would not solve the strike problem without posing additional problems.
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